My Sunday Times column is available on www.thetimes.co.uk – this is an excerpt. Not to be reproduced without permission.
Now official figures confirm that the economy has recovered from its dip in the second half of last year, and the Bank of England is a bit more optimistic on inflation, we can expect to hear a lot more from ministers along the lines of “the plan is working”. Rishi Sunak tweeted it within seconds of Friday’s first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) figures being released. It’s not all about me, but I sometimes think this slogan has been adopted with the specific aim of making me cringe.
I don’t blame the government for celebrating the 0.6 per cent first quarter rise in GDP, which was better than expected. Time will tell whether March and the first quarter were flattered by the early Easter, but the economy has clearly recovered well from the “technical” recession in the second half of last year. Even GDP per head, which rose by 0.4 per cent, broke out of its long fall, though was still down by 0.7 per cent on a year earlier.
And I know what the government is up to with this “plan is working” stuff, which is to try to draw attention to the lack of policy detail offered by Labour. But apart from the strong echoes of Baldrick’s “cunning plan” in Blackadder — or a smug managerial type saying “all going according to plan” when it is not — if there is anything that the past few years have taught us, it is that the idea of a plan for the economy is for the birds.
When the Tories were re-elected in December 2019, under the last prime minister but one, there was no plan for big tax hikes. Rather, there would be huge increases in infrastructure spending and an aggressive levelling up programme, as set out in the first budget of the Parliament in March 2020.
Then the pandemic happened, alongside the negative economic consequences of Brexit, which persist, and a huge expansion of the size of the state – some of which is permanent – necessitated big increases in tax. Infrastructure plans were scaled back and the abandonment of the northern leg of HS2, partly replaced by filling potholes in roads, was a symbol of the end of ambition. With one or two minor exceptions, levelling up has been a failure.
Even the current Tory “retail offer”, cutting and eventually abolishing employee national insurance (the abolition part will never happen), was never a plan. As chancellor Rishi Sunak insisted on an increase in NI, to form the basis of a new health and social care levy.
On inflation, the government has played at best a marginal role in its fall, though things could have been a lot worse had it not supported the Bank in raising rates. And are we supposed to think that part of the plan was to have a zany prime minister in office for less than 50 days, after which her sensible successor could restore stability?
Anybody with a sense of UK economic history should be very cautious about the idea of a plan. It is not just that Harold Macmillan’s “events, dear boy” are likely to mean that the best-laid plans are likely to be blown off course, and that the UK has shown itself to be unprepared for shocks.
The most famous example of a failed plan was in the 1960s, and the election of the Labour government in 1964. Based on the French model of indicative planning but sounding a bit too much for some like Soviet or Chinese five-year plans, the UK national plan, launched in 1965, was short-lived, as was the Department of Economic Affairs set up to administer it.
There are, though, other examples in less likely quarters. I thought I knew everything about Margaret Thatcher’s monetarist experiment of the 1980s, having written a book about it, The Rise and Fall of Monetarism, later that decade.
A new account from somebody who witnessed it from closer at hand, Thatcher’s former private secretary Sir Tim Lankester, has new things to say however. Inside Thatcher’s Monetarist Experiment: the Promise, The Failure, The Legacy, to be published shortly by Policy Press, is his account.
Lankester, on secondment from the Treasury, was private secretary to James Callaghan, the Labour prime minister, for seven months before the 1979 general election and retained that role when she became prime minister in May 1979. He got on well with Thatcher and, until the arrival of Alan Walters as her personal economic adviser in early 1981, was the only trained economist in Downing Street.
I had always thought that the Conservatives came to office well prepared, thanks to the work of the Economic Reconstruction Group chaired in opposition by Geoffrey Howe, who became her first chancellor (a different ERG to the one in the Tory party that has made headlines in recent years).
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